# Climate Change Implications for Future Energy Systems

#### January 16, 2008, Verbund, Vienna.

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# Drivers of the Climate Change Challenge

- Demographic (growth & composition)
- Economic (growth, structure, disparities)
- Social (values, lifestyles, policies)
- Technologic (rates & direction of change)
- Environmental (limits, adaptability)
- Valuation (discounting, non-market damages and benefits)

#### Drivers can be both source and remedy!



Forecasting impossible!  $\rightarrow$  Scenario Approach



# **Global Carbon & Warming Budgets**


GtC			(	°C warming u	incertainty	
	Emissions 1700-2007 Atmospheric increase			0.8	0.3 - 1.2	
1000 Reserves of coal, oil, gas >20,000 Total carbon fuel endowment						
Emissions 2000-2100, <u>no climate policy</u>						
>2000	High	A2, A1FI		>4.0	2.5 - 7.5	
1300-1500	Medium	B2		~3.0	2.0 - 5.0	
1000	Low	B1, A1T		~2.7	1.5 - 4.5	
Emissions 2000-2100, for stabilization at:						
ppm CO <sub>2</sub> ppm CO <sub>2</sub> -e						
850		500	680	2.5	1.4 - 4.0	
650		450	600	2.1	1.2 - 3.5	
<400		380	500	<2.0	1.0 - 3.0	



Scope for climate stabilization efforts depend on: (1) Baseline and (2) Climate Target



#### A Taxonomy of Scenarios (ex. IPCC SRES)



<u>Different</u> combination of driving forces can lead to <u>similar</u> emissions and climate change outcomes **EMISSIONS:** 

High: POP: High GDP: Medium Efficiency: Low TECH: Dirty

Medium:

Low: POP: Low GDP: High Efficiency: High TECH: Clean A1FI A2 A1B B2 A1T


**B1** 



Largest TECH leverage of climate policies: high GDP (capital turnover) and high efficiency!








IPCC WG1 TAR: "By 2100, the range in the surface temperature response across the group of climate models run with a given scenario is comparable to the range obtained from a single model run with the different SRES scenarios"

## Climate Change:


Projected Global Mean Temperature Change and Sources of Uncertainty (IPCC-TAR, 2001)






### Projected Surface Temperature Change

A1B, 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999








Source: IPCC-AR4 WG1, 2007





EU Regional Climate Variability: Observations (b) modeled for present (c) and future (d) conditions.

Note 2003 heat wave being far outside both observational and model range.

IPCC uncertainty terminology (adopted from Schneider and Moss) : <1% probability ="exceptionally unlikely" (but 2003 happened!)

# Air Conditioning

	% of Households with AC	% commercial buildings with AC
US	81%	80%
Japan	85%	~100%
EU	5%	27%
China (urban HH)	7%	n.a.

Conservative Projection: 4-fold increase in EU to 2020 worldwide to 2030

World AC electricity use: 2000: 800 TWh 2030: >2700 TWh (=75% of total US electricity)




Source: P. Waide, IEA



### Projected Water Availability (Runoff)

A1B, 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999




#### Source: IPCC-AR4 WG1, 2007

Note: Hatched areas indicate good model agreement, white areas indicate model disagreement



#### Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change Scenarios.





Source: IIASA LUCC, 2000.



# Reducing CC Vulnerabilities


- Economic & Social Development un-targeted and asymmetrical poverty vulnerability: affluence vulnerability: +
- <u>Adaptation</u> targeted to CC
- <u>Emissions reduction (mitigation)</u> lowering CC but not eliminating it (min committed warming >1.5 °C)




adaptation a necessity rather than option



#### Vulnerability to CC by 2050 (IPCC-AR4 WG2, 2007)




Panel A A2 current adaptive capacity



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Panel B Improved adaptive capacity



# Climate Change: The Bottom Line

#### Vast uncertainties

(targets & mitigation feasibility/costs):

- -- impacts (warming plus variability)
- -- technology (which ones when, where, how)

#### • Magnitude of challenge depends on:

- -- future development in "South"
- -- technologies available (efficiency AND clean supply)
- Policy Approach: Rather than: "wait and do nothing"/ "optimum" path, get prepared, hedge risks, adapt (develop incentives, institutions, and technology mitigation/adaptation response portfolios)





## Mitigation Technology Portfolio Analysis

- Paramount importance of Baseline
- Costs matter
- Diffusion time constants matter
- Differences in where technology is developed and where it is deployed
- Technological interdependence and systemic aspects important in "transition" analysis
- Non-energy, non-CO2 can help (lower costs), but cannot solve problem (reduce energy-CO2)
- Multiple drivers, but all channeled via <u>investments</u>




 $\Sigma$ : Popular "wedge" analysis fails on all above accounts!



### **Mitigation Scenario Analysis**

Source: Riahi et al., TFSC 74(2007)






 $\Sigma$ : Mitigation "wedges" are baseline and target dependent



#### **Emissions & Reduction Measures**

Multiple sectors and stabilization levels







**Σ**: Energy CO<sub>2</sub> remains main problem and target for mitigation




### **Emission Reduction Measures**





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
Cumulative contribution to mitigation (2000-2100), GtC eq.



RF = Robustness factor of options across scenario uncertainty is highest for: F-gases and N2O reduction, energy conservation & efficiency, and biomass+CCS "wildcard" (if feasible)



# **Energy Sector Investments Today**






#### Note Annex-I and fossil fuel bias!



## Changes of Investments (2000-2050) due to Climate Constraints



Climate policies will lead to both winners and losers in the battle for investments. The institutional dimensions and the differences between established large and nascent growing sectors must not be ignored

# **Energy Systems Implications**


- Highest vulnerability in energy sector (prime climate policy target under increasing demand, incl. from CC)
- Long-term target: Zero emissions
- Large point sources (power plants): Early targets and risk of stranded investments (prepare for CCS or nuclear or "die")
- Transformation constraint: End-use (lifestyles) and infrastructures (esp. in transportation)



"Conventional wisdom" scenarios are poor strategic guide for transition planning




# A2r - 2000








# A2r - 2100







# A2r - 2100 – 670 ppm stabilization








# North -- South

- Responsibility: Mostly in Annex-I
- Vulnerability: Mostly in "South"
- Adaptation capacity: Mostly in Annex-I
- Future emission growth: Mostly in "South"
- Near-term mitigation potential: highest in Annex-I
- Near-term mitigation costs: lowest in "South"






## Contribution to CO<sub>2</sub> Concentration Increase







## UNFCC Annex-I Emissions (all GHGs CO<sub>2</sub>-equiv)






Climate stabilization: 700 ppm by 2100 (2.5°C) 500 ppm by 2100 (<2°C)



# Developing Countries (all GHGs CO<sub>2</sub>-equiv)





Climate stabilization: 700 ppm by 2100 (2.5°C) 500 ppm by 2100 (<2°C)

# Strategies for Addressing Climate Change

- Given pervasive uncertainty, adopt portfolio approach (mitigation+adaptation)
- Largest "silver bullet": Demand management
- Biggest challenge: Not in engineering but in political economy (consistency of long-term incentives/signals)
- Largest "shifts" required: less technological, but in <u>OECD innovation environment</u> (reverse declining R&D, investments, shortterm market myopia) and <u>integration of</u> <u>developing countries</u>



 $\Sigma$ : Modeling can help in identifying optimal technology hedging portfolios but cannot help in solving the incentive/innovation environment problem

